Housing, China and Big Tech – all are regarded as ‘un-investable’ – ending last year the above three sectors were all under a cloud, but one broke free, why?


Plus, Powell scares the market by thinking too loudly.




Well let’s start with housing. UK residential property prices are holding up fairly well given the magnitude of rate rises, while UK housebuilder share prices look fairly awful. There is a confusing mix of income and capital issues to examine.


Housing itself holds up well – many reasons: demand of course, high levels of employment, heavy net migration and the normal new household formation provide a base demand level well above new build levels. At a time when it is unattractive to fund speculative new build (so units not pre-sold before commencement) because of finance charges, and with a planning system that is both over prescriptive and under resourced, supply will stay slow.


So, the logic of fairly steady prices for existing housing stock holds, buyers will need more cash, but with (in real terms) falling house prices, that can be done. It moves funds from (largely UK) borrowers to (largely UK) savers, but leaves total disposal income in the country (after HMRC takes a cut) largely unaltered.


While rising rentals, reflecting pent up demand and the pressure on debt funded landlords, adds to new build demand and provokes more supply at the institutional level, at least. So, we don’t see a price crash (however desirable in some areas) at these levels.


So why then are housebuilders so disliked? Sales of houses will indeed slow, so reducing dividend cover, but the core business itself is fine and the capital value holds steady, albeit discounted by more.



China? Here we have almost the same issue, fundamentally sound, but politically hard to justify investment. That taint spreads to companies that sell into China too. It is very hard to ignore this vast market, and the undoubted speed of innovation and high productivity of a command economy. When so many other places fall back, China is tempting.

China has the size, finance skills and levers to deliberately act counter-cyclically, stepping out of sync with the global economy. So (on that narrative) it has ducked the blight of post COVID reopening inflation, by a deliberately slow exit, stockpiling commodities, and then stepping out of the market to defuse price spikes.

Arguably even with foreign capital, it was happy to load up when it was cheap with few restrictions, on both equity and debt, but equally happy to step back when prices and restrictions start to apply. Choice or circumstance? In an opaque system who really knows. . . But a China slowdown is not the same in type or duration as a free market one.

Like housebuilders it remains uninvestable, but for all that, there is value.



So, to the third of the trinity, large cap tech. These are all US based, highly profitable, with not a lot of debt, but typically appear overvalued. In the old free money days, fast growing tech was enough, so the layer just below, also profitable, simply fed off the reflected glory of the mega caps, and so on all the way down to the start-ups and chronic loss makers. That link has broken, values are now about both size and sector. This is odd. Normally if you broke (say) Microsoft into ten equal parts the total value would go up. This year suggests it would now fall.

So, what are investors doing, if they are ignoring fundamentals? It seems the cash generating highly liquid stocks do enjoy excess market demand in tough times. Some of it is momentum following, some is a falling share count, but mainly it seems investors just really like the name recognition and deep liquidity, to trade the market.

From this website.

If so, it may be dangerous to write this group off. In a market going sideways they provide the price action, and it seems they are so big, so well entrenched and global, that the typical stock specific risk can almost be ignored. You need to be nimble; they fell hard in 2022, but their dominant recovery this year, providing nearly all of global equity performance might be the true reversion to the mean, rather than their sudden collapse when everything was being sold off last year. But that process does guarantee future volatility for them too, and history suggests it will not last.




We have nothing to add on what seems a be a new set of forever wars, beyond sadness and dismay. While whoever wins the 2024 elections on either side of the Atlantic, will be forced to do an “Erdogan turn”, or 360 spin. This could happen fairly soon after the polls close.




The markets seem not to like Jerome Powell’s musings on the vast range of things he does not know, at The Economic Club in New York this week. Does his calendar suddenly show his exit date, albeit over two years away? You could almost hear the soft polish of his resume to concede errors and some failed guesses. He even, twice, called US fiscal policy “unsustainable” although he was careful to say that was not now, but only in the future (after he’s left office that is.)


But the long run neutral rate? No idea. The Philipps Curve? No idea. Interest rate transmission rates? No idea. That’s not new, though – it is pretty much what “Data Dependent” always has meant, and markets were previously fine with that.


We will know soon enough, if rates are still rising globally. It certainly makes markets jittery, especially on Friday afternoons.