DREAMERS
What would Trumpâs high tariff isolationist world look like? What would the mirror image be in Xiâs China? Not now, not next week, but rolling into the next decade.
And whatever portfolio theory says, and whatever the optimistic investor believes, 80% of my own portfolio is flotsam, drifting up and down on Pacific tides. Stocks I both like and which have compounded over decades are remarkably few. Oh, and a brief word on African housing.
GOING IT ALONE
But first, to give it the grand name, autarchy, or self-sufficiency. A bit of a joke - the Soviet Union tried it, Iran tries it, China famously only revived after ditching it.
But it is back in fashion, and not just in strange places. The EU industrial and agricultural policy is starting to look like a version; beyond their four walls they need carbon and chemicals, but within them they donât, nor will they allow imports of them (or products including them). Quite fantastic.
Trump is on his 60% tariffs line. Xi clearly wants to cut off foreign capital, as it arrives infected with democracy and transparency, and the associated foreign reporting or verification.
So, could they? Yes, the US could - it is big enough, can do most things, and largely trades internally. While at least in Trumpâs imagination the commercial borders are sealed, and so enforceable.
What goes wrong? Well at some, quite distant, point people stop expecting to trade with the US. So, at its most extreme, if China canât sell to the US, it wonât buy from them either. But that is decades away, most Chinese production can probably take a 300% tariff, and still sell at a profit.
The flip side of the tariff is the huge salary for a barista, or a trucker. The latter is not so far away. Prices of domestic US production must rise, to allow the blue-collar Mid-West to rejuvenate. US consumers of course (including that barista) will pay vastly more for US goods, or will get hit with the import tariff; this of course is a tax on them.
What about Xi? Well again it is possible - thatâs how China ran for much of his life, with a lot of new infrastructure, industrialization, since installed. He can do it all again. There, unlike in the US, the issue is capital. As a big net exporter, an area that will itself be under pressure, money will be harder to find; it already is.
THE NIGHTMARE
Countries that go through this closing cycle typically also do default (as the Soviets did, as US (and UK) railways did,). Folly, but it can be done.
The US has been going down this route since Obama, Trump talked a lot about it, but Biden too sees the resulting wage inflation as a good thing. So, it is the next US Presidentâs policy either way.
Obama was keen on hitting capital markets (FATCA was and remains both a non-tariff barrier (I am being polite here) and a tariff on external capital) and I suspect a Biden administration must do the same, to balance the books.
While Xi never really left protectionism, WTO and GATT were mainly honoured in the breach.
And Europe? There is quite a strong strategic need to expand to the East, although as that goes through (and we are talking the mid 2030âs here) Ukrainian farmers, like Polish farmers today, will buckle under the rules; it barely matters about the Donbas, the EU will shut those heavy industries down too.
So, I think autarchy can work for all three, it will support a large uncompetitive labour force, and consumer choice will vanish. In many cases there will be lower quality and high prices. All three will attack (or in some cases keep attacking) capital flows.
And in the end, the entrepots will survive, those not in any such block, like the UAE or Singapore today, Amsterdam in the 17th Century, Yemen under the Romans and Victorian Britain.
The winners will be flexible, a tad amoral, assertive, in fluid alliances, but reliant on gold not steel to survive. And they will suck in entrepreneurial talent too. At a strategic level, that feels the place to be looking. Although buying uncompetitive heavy industries before their brief period of tariff induced profitability, has a short-term allure.
DOGS OR GREYHOUNDS ?
The ludicrous halving of CGT allowances, based on some fantasy âyieldâ number from the equally ludicrous HMRC, via the OBR, means once again the tiresome process of harvesting losses is upon us. No longer can they sit unloved at the back, snoozing; out they must come.
And what a tale of dross they reveal, and scattered amongst them so many once âgood ideasâ and busted yield stocks. Well, it sticks in the throat, but perhaps sticking it in a US wonder stock for six months is better?
Of course, if I knew when I acquired them that the FTSE was moribund for two decades, I would never have bothered. Seems it is time to simplify.
COLLATERAL
And lastly African housing. It was one of Gordon Brownâs (and the PRAâs) great achievements to get UK banks out of overseas assets, far too volatile, currency? foreigners?- Who needs them? Bring it all home and inflate the UK housing market with safe, cheap, mortgages.
So, Citizens went, Barclays were hounded out of South Africa, and so on â although their post-sale performance has really not been great either. Africa now just does not have proper mortgage financing for the vast bulk of the population. This is at a level I had failed to fully comprehend.
You think that despite everything, Africa must have got better. But no housing, so less health, less stability, no financial security. Safe recycling of profits in the continent is still hard. Aid canât create institutional reform, but thatâs the need.
If you look for the breakout into developed status, it starts there.
The Glass Bead Game
We look today at a domestic version of a complex, rulebound meaningless pursuit that too many of our brightest and best waste their lives pursuing, and whose twists and spirals ultimately signify nothing. Â I mean the UK Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR), of which I took a tour this week. Almost nothing there is as it seems.
Meanwhile markets reprise 2023, with tech or bust once more. Although tech and bust is the market fear, as fiscal stimulus and services inflation hold rates too high for some to survive.
UK OBR
The OBR was an explicitly political creation of the coalition government in 2010, with a remit to somehow restrain the ever-increasing debt governments take on, to bribe electors. They were also keeping half an eye on the much older âdebt ceilingâ style US legislation. It failed; so now the OBR just thrives on telling the government how much more it can spend or not collect, with spurious accuracy; purportedly managing public money.
It doesnât forecast anything as a forecast is an expected outturn. All it does is crank the handle on the old, discredited Treasury model, creating projections. A projection is 1) a âwhat ifâ assuming all other things are equal and 2) only as good as its underlying model.
One clear flaw is the requirement to take government spending plans as viable when they are usually not. They also have no idea where public sector productivity is heading. It has no remit to look at how productivity might be helped and no capacity to look back at how wrong its old âforecastsâ were. That is the job of the National Audit Office, it seems.
It also wonât talk to the Bank of England, as that organization has executive powers (to raise or lower rates) and the OBR apparently must just be a commentator: more glass bead rules.
So, it fiddles with the model and its six hundred inputs and countless equations to give precise answers to pointless questions, because each answer sits in its own vacuum.
Thereâs a heavy focus too on tax revenue, but with quite a thin staff, this results in excessive reliance on HMRC, who can be hopelessly wrong (and typically over optimistic on tax yields). But again, if the tax bods claim some complex, job destroying, arcane nonsense will raise income, in it goes. The side effects of such decisions must also be ignored.
It has no remit to assess how taxes impact productivity, which partly explains many of Huntâs blatantly anti-growth measures. As a result, the economy is locked into low productivity, getting steadily worse.
From the ONS flash report here
For all that the financial press will be full of the OBR cogitations on the forthcoming budget (March 6th). One little bit of power they do have involves a requirement for the Chancellor to give ten daysâ notice of the budget contents (hence no doubt the usual leakage levels) and for two months before that, they sift through proposals and indicate how each, in isolation, would work. The economy is an interconnected entity, they know, yet there is no attempt to give us an overall view.
THE LOST RALLY
I have few rational reasons why anyone would lend the UK Government at under 4% for ten years, were it not for some foolish faith in the OBR projections, without reading the small print.
Which brings us to markets: back in November the UK ten-year gilt yielded 4.5%, by about Christmas falling to 3.5%, and now it is back over 4% and headed higher.
Chart from this website
Quite a spin in ten weeks for a ten-year duration instrument. This is why that Christmas rally in value stocks was ignited, and indeed started to push out into Real Estate, various Alternatives and certain smaller stocks.
Although it didnât move those stocks most sensitive to the credit markets, who will need to rollover/refinance current debt. This affects for example, the renewables, private equity, and office property. The problem there is of both rates and availability. With the scale of asset mark downs, whether interest is 6% or 8% is not the issue; there is no funding appetite even at 20%.
The year-end rally moved a wide group of stocks, from extremely cheap to still very cheap. We then realized that it was not yet safe to go back in, so buyers evaporated, and prices faded. With state debt at 4%, against persistent inflation, fixed income is also oddly unenticing. So, the market default has been to pile back into the biggest, most liquid, US tech stocks and similar easy-in/easy-out momentum trades, like bitcoin.
There is little sign of deflation in services, no evidence of it in housing, where supply issues dominate, and little in financial services; indeed, all the supply side mess of COVID and excess regulation, is simply getting worse. Public sector pay inflation is also high and going higher (donât tell the OBR).
This does not dent the 2024 story of cutting rates and hence higher stock markets, but it may require some patience, and that delay may itself create more pain.
The Glass Bead Game and the âlost marblesâ qualification for office
Our games of self deception are not to be confused with lost marbles of course; it turns out that the onset of senility is now a bar to being prosecuted for storing secret state papers and also, somehow, a recommendation for re-election for four more years, to the most powerful post in the world.
If that ends up giving us Trump again, by default, presumably he will at least have a defense in future years, against those same crimes? He does not have the âBiden defenseâ available at present, perhaps thankfully.
As the OBR shows, very clever institutions can come up with very silly solutions.
Reserve in Reverse
Fallen Emperor?
With almost two thirds of global equity markets represented by the US, the fall in the dollar so far this year is quite dramatic, and for many investments, more important than the underlying asset.
UK retail investors are especially exposed to this, as although Jeremy Hunt (UK Chancellor) may not notice it, the US is where most UK investors went, when his partyâs policies ensured the twenty-year stagnation in UK equity prices.
While Sunak continues to pump up wage inflation, which he claims, âwonât cause inflation, raise taxes or increase borrowingsâ Has he ever sounded more transparently daft? Sterling, knowing bare faced lies well enough, then simply drifts higher. Markets know such folly in wage negotiation can only lead to inflation and higher interest rates.
We noted back in the spring, in our reference to âdollar dangerâ that this trade (sell dollar, buy sterling) had started to matter, and we began looking for those hedged options, and to reduce dollar exposure. To a degree this turned out to be the right call, but in reality, the rate of climb of the NASDAQ, far exceeded the rate of the fall in the dollar.
While sadly the other way round, a lot of resource and energy positions fell because of weaker demand and the extra supply and stockpile drawdowns, which high prices will always produce. But that decline was then amplified by the falling dollar, as most commodities are priced in dollars. So, a lot of âsafeâ havens (with high yields) turn out to have been unsafe again.
The impact of currency on inflation
Currency also has inflation impacts. Traditionally if the pound strengthens by 20%, then UK input prices fall 20%. The latest twelve-month range is from USD1.03 to USD1.31 now, a 28% rise in sterling.
In a lot of the inflation data, this is amplified by a similar 30% fall in energy, from $116 to $74 a barrel for crude over a year. In short, a massive reversal in the double price shock of last year. In fairness this is what Sunak had been banking on, and why the âgreedflationâ meme is able to spread. But while that effect is indeed there, other policy errors clearly override and mask it.
A Barrier to the Fed.
In the US we expect the converse, rising inflation from the falling currency, maybe that is creeping through, but not identified as such, just yet, as price falls from supply chains clearing lead the way, but it is in there.
Finally, of course, this time, the dire performance of the FTSE is probably related to the same FX effect on overseas earnings assumptions. Plus, the odd mix of forecast data and historic numbers that we see increasingly and idiosyncratically used just in the UK. If the banks forecast a recession, regardless of that recessionâs absence, they will raise loan loss reserves, and cut profits, even if the reserves never get used.
Meanwhile, UK property companies are now doing the same, valuing collapsing asset values on the basis of the expected recession, and not on actual trades. So, if you have an index with heavy exposures to stocks, that half look back, half reflect forward fears, it will usually be cheaper than the one based on reality.
Why so Insipid?
OK, so why is the dollar weak? Well, if we knew that, we would be FX traders. But funk and the Fedâs âfront footâ posture are the best answers we have, and both seem likely to be transient too.
If the world is saying donât buy dollars, either from fear of the pandemic or Russian tank attacks or bank failures, thatâs the funk. As confidence resumes and US equity valuations look more grotesque, the sheep venture further up the hill and out to sea. To buy in Europe or Japan, they must sell dollars.
The VIX, in case you were not watching, has Smaug like, resumed its long-tailed slumber, amidst a pile of lucre.
From Yahoo Finance CBOE Volatility Index
So as the four horsemen head back to the stables, the dollar suffers a loss.
The Fed was also into inflation fighting early; it revived the moribund bond markets, enticed European savers with positive nominal rates, (a pretty low-down trick, to grab market share) and announced the end of collective regal garment denial policies. But having started and then had muscular policies, it must end sooner, and perhaps at a lower level. So that too leads to a sell off in the dollar.
Where do we go instead?
So where do investors go instead?
In general, it is either to corporate debt, or other sovereigns. Japan is not playing, the Euro maybe fun, but not so much if Germany is getting back to normal sanity and balancing the books again. So, the cluster of highly indebted Western European issuers are next.
Sterling now ticks those boxes, plenty of debt, liquid market, no fear of rate cuts for a while, irresponsible borrowing, what is not to like?
For How Long
When does that end? Well, the funk has ended. You can see how the SVB failure caused a dip in the spring, but now the curve looks upward again. Although fear can come back at any time, as could some good news for the UK on inflation. However even the sharp drop the energy/exchange rate effects will cause soon, leave UK base rates well south of UK inflation rates.
So, every bit of good news for the Fed, is bad news if you hold US stocks here.
How high and how fast does sterling go?
Well, it has a bit of a tailwind, moves like any other market in fits and starts, but could well go a bit more in our view. Oddly the FTSE would be a hedge (of sorts).
PICTURES OF MATCHSTICK MEN
I noted at the end of our last bulletin, that markets are feeling strangely bullish, for a few reasons, which I share. Although only in some places. I still find little attractive in most debt markets. They are cheap, but given losses this year, are they good value?
And UK politics is becoming boring, which is no bad thing.
So, were we right to predict that interest rates alone cannot tame inflation?
Our original thesis for this year, that interest rates could not tame inflation alone, maybe is right. The level needed would cause too much damage. But that is applicable (we now see) to the UK, but not as yet to the US. And oddly perhaps not as yet to the EU either, although Lagarde midweek, perhaps had the same tilt. But German profligacy may wreck that.
The logic is the same for them all. You canât tame this beast by rate rises alone, as double figure inflation needs double figure interest rates and that is just not happening.
The UK is certainly not prepared for that level of rates and fiscal restraint is therefore now required. Fiscal drag will do some of the heavy lifting, and energy price declines a fair bit more.
Some commodity market statistics were released by the World Bank, this quarter. The above graph is extracted from their statistical report
But tax rises and government spending cuts will still be needed to cool the UK labour market. In particular the public sector must be reined in, or service cuts made.
Earnings will fall, taxes rise, growth stall, discontent rise. But still no collapse in housing (secondary) markets or in employment.
Nor do I therefore see much rise in loan defaults. This makes the recent round of forward-looking bank provisions unusually daft. You canât audit the future, so how can you include it in historic accounts? A weird hybrid. Best to ignore all that and focus on now, and now is still not terrible. With a pretty hefty valuation discount in situ.
(Data downloaded from the Office of National Statistics for this in house graph).
The US political situation
In the US, The Federal Reserve have effectively said if there is no fiscal restraint, they will ramp up rates till there is, or inflation falls. That is scary, but it looks as if the Mid Terms will hobble Biden and stop some of his fiscally reckless measures. He thought the wave that toppled Kwasi missed him, but it was the same ocean, and likely will give him a rough ride too.
Bidenâs approach felt good, overindulgence often does, but the pain of the untethered dollar is now starting to hurt US earnings, and in time US jobs, however much they dream of legislating against that. The impact of rate rises is also probably less than it sounds in the media, partly because most reporters are likely to have mortgages, whereas a growing number of investors donât.
Overall US government policy remains to force up inflation and challenge the Fed to sort it out. Hence all the Fed threats are directed not at the market (which cares) but at The White House (that does not). Mid Terms (on the current path) will therefore be a big boost to US markets, as it means Congress at least, will start to work with, not against the Fed. As with Kwasi, a reckless budget will not pass unchallenged again this time. Those extremes belong to the COVID era, that is now over.
Comparison with the UK position â and where Europe maybe is headed
With that battle already won in the UK, both sterling and to a degree UK rates are reverting to the status quo ante. And as sterling rises so the FTSE falls; that link also remains. If the UK is neither chasing interest rates up, nor letting the pound fall, it gives Europe some cover to do likewise.
In truth although sounding dramatic, in the real world it is inflation that really counts not (as yet) interest rates which are still absurdly low.
The Tory Party â what can we discern?
Talking of status quo, thatâs where the Tory party is now headed. Cameron drifted too far left, Boris dithered, Truss drifted right, and now the new government is a hybrid, although colloquial English perhaps has a stronger word for it.
I sense that spending decisions may correctly be back with a powerful Chancellor. There is a seeming party truce till the next election, when half the current Cabinet seats will vanish anyway, and then who knows?
Or if this coup and enforced hybridisation fails, we really will know the party is split, and a General Election could follow. Unlikely, though.
Why bullish then?
US earnings except for highly indebted outfits, will probably stay surprisingly strong for a while yet. And likewise, the dollar pivot point is being pushed further out, as no one else in the developed world is going for rates quite that high (or that fast).
There are also two market forces to look out for, rising rates and slowing growth is one, but the simultaneous loss of liquidity is another. The former will cause a patchwork of changes, both good and bad, but the latter the ending of a multi-year bubble.
It all remains cyclical â a transition, not a bounce
The difference is key, rates are possibly a two-year cycle, a bubble a ten-year one. The bubble in non-revenue companies, and in absurd multiples for even profitable tech, will take longer to deflate, be slower to re-inflate and be muddied further by all that spare capital accelerating technological change. This is still not an area we either feel confident in, or trust their valuations.
If we really are back to the status quo in the UK, about to be in the US, why would markets be going down, down, deeper and down?
The Times They are A Changinâ
Rishi or Truss, can either be worse than Boris?
Also, we do seem to be decisively leaving the decade of low rates and by implication the experiment of quantitative easing. On a twelve-month basis, bar the FTSE 100, all major markets are down, although that is only just true for Europe and Japan. The Nasdaq and Aim are the big losers, and their recent recovery looks like a head fake to us.
We look at the global economy, and investment options.
So, what does the race for the next UK prime minister now look like?
It is not that important anyway, if as I assume, the next election is lost already.
These are stand in candidates, with no real grip on the party and likely to be loathed by the surviving group of Tory MP after that 2025 contest. Like a relegated football manager, they will have shaky job prospects.
Is there much to choose between them? Again, I am not sure, they have established that the party to its core hates higher taxation, whatever fantasies Boris had, and some at least understand that a smaller government or higher debt, is what the hard choices of governing are about.
I rather expect much of the âdifficultâ stuff attempted by the last Cabinet will get ditched by new ministers. It still would be wrong to say the new team canât achieve much, the governing majority is solid, and further bloodletting inconceivable. I would anticipate that they will still have two and a half years to run.
The two candidates compared
Sunak is admired for his high-profile experience as Chancellor, disliked for his willingness to raise taxes, loathed for wielding the knife on Boris. Truss is thought to be opportunistic, and rather unfairly for being dim and not substantial.
But I donât expect much of a change, more fiscal conservatism, less besotted greenery, perhaps less socially liberal, but only to the extent of holding the line, not really rowing back. Short term stability, long term decline.
Preparing for another European killing field?
But you do feel Sunak would be less of a cold war warrior.
The report that the Chief of the British General Staff had called this âour 1937 momentâ and launched âOperation MOBILISEâ suggests the bloodlust is well and truly up, all adding to the hefty training programme. We are already deep into a proxy war ourselves.
I hear it is just as insane in the Pentagon. There is even high level gossip about this being the final great âkilling fieldâ in our centuriesâ old hostility to Russia.
Economy : two questions affecting interest rates and inflation
As for the global economy, we had two great questions for the year, how long could the Fed âextend and pretendâ over inflation, and how quickly everyone else would then play catch up.
Well pretty well the day Powell was re-confirmed earlier this year, he binned the Jackson Hole pretence that high employment did not have to mean high inflation.
I suspect (and so do markets) that he wonât really go after inflation, if he did so, we would have interest rates in double figures by Christmas.
Bread, job, and a roof, these three a politician must provide, and just one without the others, is a vote destroyer.
The current modest level of rate rises will let inflation creep lower, but will not control it, and we donât see interest rates topping out for quite a while, not helped by the very low starting point. Although overall, it looks like the currency markets are forcing the rest of the world to follow in raising rates quite fast and in the end, to the same levels. Nevertheless, in Europe the response to double digit inflation, has so far only extended to ending negative rates.
As if that will matter, as the Euro collapses; they will have to move faster. Lagarde confidently delivering total guff and mysterious lawyerly threats wonât save Italy.
The economic models everyone is relying on to forecast otherwise, seem to assume no incremental rise in energy prices next year, and indeed a sizable fall. That maybe so, but there will still be a lag as this yearâs rises have not been fully absorbed and will echo and bounce around the economy for a while to come. Not least through a still very tight labour market, which has several years of lost capacity due to COVID and indeed the familiar demographic time bomb.
A slackening in wage inflation needs US and Northern European unemployment to at least double; no sign of that yet. It is a muddled employment market with spatial and skill deficits, so increasing capacity where it matters, will take time. Not least because of persistent high surplus labour levels to the South and West in Europe.
So, if the Fed (and Wall Street) insists (as it does) on calling this transitory inflation, or now the new phrase, âpeak inflationâ, they are simply using dud econometric models (again).
What next?
Cash flow will again be king, capital will be well rewarded in the bond markets, dividends will have competition, non-dividend payers face a long winter. Experience of the dot com bust, and then the banking crisis, suggests it takes three or four years to retool models based on prior poor capital allocation (and boy have we had that). Not the three or four months which is being assumed.
Granted we were oversold at 3666 on the S&P 500, perhaps an auspicious low. Yields meanwhile had shot out beyond reason, but reluctantly we consider this pleasant bounce canât survive. We accept too that earnings are OK, but they are in most cases a poor indicator of economic forces that take years to establish themselves. The extinction of even capitalist dinosaurs takes time.
And then there is the great concertina of rates: ignore what each Central Bank says, in the end they must march to one beat, that of the dollar.
Monogram performance, compared to others in the Absolute Return sector
It is striking that our USD MonograM model now holds no equities or bonds, our GBP MonograM model is fully invested in both. While the list of storied Absolute Return managers who fail to beat our model remains embarrassing.
Download the newsletter of which this table is a section, for the full data.
There is no availability of this model, except through ourselves; perhaps it is time to talk to us about using it?
Do get in touch, an exploratory discussion is never wasted.
We wish you a pleasant summer: as good Europeans, we will fall silent for August.
I hope it all looks clearer when we return. Â
Charles A R Gillams